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DOES SEX MATTER? WASHINGTON'S DEFENSE OF
MARRIAGE ACT UNDER THE EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTION
Thomas C. Schroeder
Abstract: Washington State's Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) defines marriage as a
civil contract between a male and a female and explicitly bans marriages between members
of the same sex. Yet the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Washington State
Constitution prohibits laws that classify by sex. In the three decades since the enactment of
the ERA, the Washington State Supreme Court has recognized only two narrow exceptions to
the ERA's ban of sex-based classifications: laws based on anatomical differences between
the sexes and laws created to mandate equality between men and women. Whether the
DOMA effects a sex-based classification and therefore violates the ERA presents the
Washington State Supreme Court with an issue of first impression. When analyzing the
DOMA, the Washington State Supreme Court should apply absolute scrutiny, a level of
scrutiny which exceeds that applied by other courts that have found laws creating sex
classifications to be sex discrimination. In so doing, the court should find that the DOMA
results in a sex-based classification that is prohibited by the ERA and conforms to neither of
the ERA's two narrow exceptions. As such, the Washington State Supreme Court should
hold that Washington State's DOMA effects a sex-based classification expressly prohibited
by the Washington State Constitution.
Jim and Chris meet and individually fall in love with identical twin
sisters, Mary and Jane.' Both couples reside in Washington State and
would like to be married in Washington. Each couple-Jim and Mary as
well as Chris and Jane-separately applies for a marriage license. Under
Washington State's Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),2 a valid
marriage can exist between only a male and a female.3 Thus, in
considering each couple's application for a marriage license,4 the county
1. Hypothetical created by the author.
2. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010-020 (2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (granting
states the authority to disclaim legal recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other states).
While this Comment uses the popular name of the federal statute-DOMA-this Comment
discusses only the relevant sections of the Washington State marriage statutes, hereinafter referred
to as the DOMA, and their constitutionality under the Washington State Constitution.
3. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.04.010(1).
4. See, e.g., King County Marriage License Application (requiring declaration of sex of each
applicant for marriage license), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/lars/marriage/mlapp.pdf (last
visited Feb. 11, 2005); Thurston Country Marriage License Application (requiring declaration of
sex of each applicant for marriage license), available at
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auditor must look at the sex of each applicant. 5 As a result, the county
auditor will grant Jim and Mary a marriage license because Jim is male
and Mary is female. However, the county auditor must deny Chris
(Christine) and Jane a marriage license because both are female, and the
DOMA explicitly prohibits same-sex marriage in Washington State.6
The issue of whether the Washington State DOMA's ban on same-sex
marriages is constitutional under the Washington State Constitution has
recently come before the state's courts.7 In Andersen v. King County8
and Castle v. State,9 Washington State superior court judges ruled that
the DOMA violates the privileges and immunities and due process
clauses of the state's constitution. 0 However, in light of precedent from
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals, l both trial courts
declined to rule on the issue of whether the DOMA violates the Equal
Rights Amendment (ERA) of the Washington State Constitution.' 2 In
Singer v. Hara,13 Division I ruled on the issue of sex discrimination
under the ERA in the context of same-sex marriage.' 4 Because that
decision predated the DOMA,15 the question remains open whether the
Washington State DOMA's definition of marriage as a union between a
http://www.co.thurston.wa.us/auditor/Recording/Forms/Marriage%20Application.pdf (last visited
Feb. 11, 2005).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.140 ("Before any persons can be joined in marriage, they shall
procure a license from a county auditor .... ).
6. Id. § 26.04.020(1)(c) (prohibiting marriages when parties are persons other than a male and a
female).
7. See generally Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Super. Ct. Thurston
County Sept. 7, 2004) (memorandum opinion on constitutionality); Andersen v. King County, No.
04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Super. Ct. King County Aug. 4, 2004) (memorandum
opinion and order on cross motions for summary judgment).
8. No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Super. Ct. King County Aug. 4, 2004)
(memorandum opinion and order on cross motions for summary judgment).
9. No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Super. Ct. Thurston County Sept. 7, 2004)
(memorandum opinion on constitutionality).
10. See Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *16 (holding that DOMA violates privileges and
immunities clause of state constitution); Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at * 11 (holding that DOMA
violates both privileges and immunities and due process clauses of state constitution).
11. See Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 260, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1974) (holding that
marriage statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples did not violate ERA).
12. Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *3; Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *11; see also WASH.
CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
13. 11 Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
14. Id. at 260, 522 P.2d at 1195.
15. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010-020 (2000); Singer, II Wash. App. at 260, 522 P.2d at
1195.
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male and a female-and its resulting prohibition of a man marrying a
man or a woman marrying a woman-effects a sex classification in
violation of the ERA. Thus, the DOMA's alleged violation of the state
constitution, including the ERA, presents an issue of first impression for
the Washington State Supreme Court, which has accepted Andersen and
Castle for direct review.' 
6
This Comment argues that, under the absolutist standard of review
mandated by the ERA as it has been interpreted by Washington State
courts post-Singer,17 the DOMA violates the ERA. Accordingly, the
Washington State Supreme Court should correct the Singer court's
incorrect application of the ERA and hold that the DOMA's prohibition
of marriage between members of the same sex denies equality of rights
on account of sex. The ERA precludes differential treatment predicated
solely on a sex classification.' 8 Further, the sex classification inherent to
the DOMA conforms to neither of the two narrow exceptions to the ERA
drawn by Washington State courts: 19 The DOMA's differential treatment
of the sexes is not based on the anatomical differences between the
sexes, nor does it ameliorate the effects of past discrimination. 20 Further,
federal and state courts examining claims of sex discrimination under
standards of review less stringent than the standard required by
Washington State's ERA have found sexually discriminatory laws to be
unconstitutional.2 ' When reviewing Andersen and Castle, the
Washington State Supreme Court should consider such decisions to be
persuasive authority, particularly those from state courts finding that
laws banning same-sex marriage result in sex discrimination.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of Washington State's
16. See Letter from Ronald Carpenter, Deputy Clerk, Washington State Supreme Court, to Clerk
and Counsel in Castle v. State and Andersen v. King County 2 (Sept. 29, 2004) (notifying parties of
consolidation and accelerated direct review).
17. See Southwest Wash. Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash. 2d
109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983) (noting that ERA absolutely prohibits inequality based on
sex) [hereinafter Southwest]; see also Paul Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments:
Making a Difference or Making a Statement?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 907, 911 (1997) (noting that
Washington is one of two states to apply an absolutist standard to sex-based classifications).
18. See WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 871, 540 P.2d 882, 889
(1975).
19. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding
that laws based on anatomical differences do not violate ERA); Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d
298, 306, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (1978) (holding that laws effecting sex classifications do not violate
ERA if they mandate equality between men and women).
20. See infra Part IV.C.
21. See infra Part III.
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ERA, the standard of review employed by courts examining claims of
sex discrimination, and the narrow exceptions to the ERA recognized by
Washington State courts. Part II offers an overview of the DOMA and
an examination of the judicial treatment of marriage between same-sex
couples in Washington State. Part III discusses sex-based discrimination
in jurisdictions outside Washington, the standard of review used by
federal courts examining sex classifications, and how other state courts
have evaluated sex discrimination arguments against laws banning same-
sex marriage. Part IV argues that Washington State's DOMA violates
the ERA because it creates an unconstitutional classification based on
sex. Part IV further argues that the DOMA does not satisfy either of the
exceptions to the ERA. Finally, after comparing sex discrimination
under Washington State's ERA with treatment of sex discrimination in
other jurisdictions, Part IV argues that the logic employed by Division I
in Singer is inapposite and the prohibition of same-sex marriage effected
by Washington's DOMA is unconstitutional.
I. THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS
SEX DISCRIMINATION
Article XXXI, Section 1 of the Washington State Constitution,
commonly known as the ERA, was approved by voters on November 7,
1972, and became effective December 7, 1972.22 The ERA provides that
"[e]quality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be denied
or abridged on account of sex.",23 In approving the ERA, voters chose to
amend the state's constitution to preclude the state from passing or
enforcing any law that would confer a special privilege on one sex but
not the other.24 In so doing, voters enacted a law that was meant to
"protect the rights of all persons not to have the law discriminate against
them solely on the basis of sex.",25 The Washington State Supreme Court
has ruled that the ERA absolutely mandates equality in "the strongest of
,,26terms. ' 6 However, the court has created two narrow exceptions to the
ERA's absolute prohibition of sex classifications: laws that recognize
22. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1; Singer v. Hara, II Wash. App. 247, 250 n.4, 522 P.2d 1187,
1190 n.4 (1974).
23. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
24. Statement for HJR 61, in OFFICIAL VOTERS PAMPHLET: GENERAL ELECTION, TuEs. Nov.
7TH, 1972 (Wash.).
25. Id.
26. Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
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anatomical differences between the sexes 27 and laws that ameliorate the
effects of past discrimination.28
A. Under the ERA, the Standard of Review Is Absolute Scrutiny
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that the ERA
mandates that courts review all sex-based classifications under an
absolutist standard of review. 29 The court has established that the ERA
provides protections against sex discrimination above and beyond the
protections afforded by the federal Equal Protection Clause; the ERA
thus requires a more stringent standard of review than traditional strict
scrutiny.3° The Washington State Supreme Court has noted that "the
ERA... prohibits the sacrifice of equality for any state interest, no
matter how compelling.",31 Therefore, the ERA's absolute protection
against sex discrimination obviates the need for a Washington State
court to analyze the government's rationale or justification for a law
differentiating on the basis of sex; in other words, a rational justification
alone will not save a law that establishes a sex-based classification.
32
Under the ERA, Washington State courts do not employ the
intermediate scrutiny that applies to federal equal protection claims;
33
instead, the ERA requires a stricter standard of scrutiny, which presumes
invalid any law that results in discrimination based on sex.34 Prior to the
27. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding
that laws based on anatomical sex differences do not violate ERA).
28. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 306, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (1978) (holding that laws
effecting sex classifications do not violate ERA if they mandate equality between men and women).
29. Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d at 127, 667 P.2d at 1102 (noting that ERA absolutely prohibits
inequality based on sex); see also Linton, supra note 17, at 911 (noting that Washington and
Pennsylvania are the only states in the United States to apply an absolutist standard to sex-based
classifications).
30. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 871, 540 P.2d 882, 889 (1975); State v. Burch, 65 Wash.
App. 828, 837, 830 P.2d 357, 362 (1992).
31. Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d at 127, 667 P.2d at 1102 (emphasis omitted).
32. See Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 871, 540 P.2d at 889 (reasoning that, by adopting ERA, people of
Washington intended to provide protections against sex discrimination beyond those extant in state
and federal constitutions, thereby rendering rational relationship test irrelevant).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (noting that courts examine sex-
based classifications to determine if such classifications serve important governmental objectives
justified by reasons that are "exceedingly persuasive"). This Comment explores the analysis of sex
discrimination under the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause in greater detail in Part III.A.
34. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 663-64, 940 P.2d 642, 643-44 (1997) (noting that
rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests are not relevant under ERA); see also In re Welfare of
Hauser, 15 Wash. App 231, 237, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976) (noting that ERA absolutely prohibits
Washington Law Review
ERA, a law's sex-based classification may have survived the strict
scrutiny employed by Washington State courts examining a claim raised
under the state constitution's privileges and immunities clause; yet,
under the ERA, any sex-based classification is absolutely prohibited.35
As the Washington State Supreme Court ruled in Southwest Washington
Chapter, National Electric Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County,36 "[t]he
ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and is not
subject to even the narrow exceptions permitted under traditional strict
scrutiny." 37 Consequently, in examining a claim that a law violates the
ERA, a court's sole question is whether equality is restricted or denied
on the basis of sex.38
B. The ERA Requires Equal Access and Treatment Under the Law
Regardless of Sex
In Darrin v. Gould,39 the Washington State Supreme Court held that a
public high school rule forbidding girls from playing on a high school
football team violated the ERA. 4 0 The court relied on the ERA's
prohibition of sex discrimination to determine that the rule forbidding
girls from playing football amounted to discrimination based solely on
sex and was, therefore, unconstitutional.41 The court reasoned that,
because the Darrin girls did not have access to interscholastic sports
equal to that provided to boys, the rule at issue contravened the ERA.42
discrimination based on sex).
35. See Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 871, 540 P.2d at 889 (noting that, but for ERA, sex-based
classifications may be permissible if they survive strict scrutiny test of privileges and immunities
provision of state constitution); see also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12. (Privileges and Immunities
Clause). While Washington State courts have construed the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the
Washington State Constitution in a manner similar to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, these courts have held that the state constitution may "provide greater protection to
individual rights than that provided by the equal protection clause." Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 868,
540 P.2d at 887-88 (citing Carter v. Univ. of Wash., 85 Wash. 2d 391, 402, 536 P.2d 618, 625
(1975)); see also Guard, 132 Wash. 2d at 663-64, 940 P.2d at 643-44 (concluding that ERA
provides more stringent standard than rational relationship or strict scrutiny test); Hanson v. Hutt,
83 Wash. 2d 195, 201, 517 P.2d 599, 603 (1973) (finding, pre-ERA, that sex classifications are
subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
36. 100 Wash. 2d 109, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983).
37. Id. at 127, 667 P.2d at 1102.
38. See State v. Burch, 65 Wash. App. 828, 837, 830 P.2d 357, 362-63 (1992).
39. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
40. Id. at 877, 540 P.2d at 893.
41. Id. at 861, 540 P.2d at 883-84.
42. See id. at 876, 540 P.2d at 892 (noting that, despite similar abilities to participate, girls were
Vol. 80:535, 2005
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The Darrin court noted that any compelling interest or rational basis
asserted by the state to justify differential treatment, including protecting
girls from the harm of playing with boys, was irrelevant when viewed in
light of the "overriding compelling state interest" of the ERA to
guarantee equality between the sexes.4 3 The court interpreted the
absolute language of the ERA to supersede any other standard of
review-even strict scrutiny. 44
The Washington State Supreme Court has further established that any
law that classifies individuals on the basis of sex violates the ERA.45
This is true regardless of whether a law results in discrimination against
women or men, or whether the discrimination occurs at the individual or
the group level.46 In Guard v. Jackson,47 the Washington State Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a law that required a father of
an illegitimate child to have provided financial support to his child in
order to join in a wrongful death action following the death of that
child.48 The court held that the law discriminated on account of sex in
violation of the ERA because it placed this support requirement solely
on fathers, but not mothers, of illegitimate children.49 In addition, the
court explained that the law was unconstitutional notwithstanding the
state legislature's ability to place conditions on legislatively created
rights because the sex classification effected by the law expressly
violated the ERA.5°
C. The Washington State Supreme Court Has Recognized Two
Narrow Exceptions to the ERA
While the ERA absolutely prohibits any law that differentiates based
excluded from playing football solely because of their sex).
43. See id. at 877, 540 P.2d at 893.
44. See id. at 871, 540 P.2d at 889 (noting that mandatory language of ERA was intended to go
beyond what was otherwise accomplished under rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests).
45. See id.
46. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 666, 940 P.2d 642, 645 (1997) (noting that, as
applied, wrongful death statute discriminated against individual because it discriminated against
males as class).
47. 132 Wash. 2d 660, 940 P.2d 642 (1997).
48. Id. at 661-62, 940 P.2d at 642-43.
49. Id. at 666, 940 P.2d at 645.
50. See id. at 665, 940 P.2d at 644 (finding that improperly delineated classes cannot be justified
under legislative prerogative).
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on a sex classification,5' the Washington State Supreme Court has
interpreted the ERA to allow for two narrow exceptions.52 In City of
Seattle v. Buchanan,53 the Washington State Supreme Court created an
exception to the ERA's absolute prohibition against laws effecting sex-
based classifications when it held that laws based on the anatomical sex
differences between women and men do not violate the ERA.54 The
Buchanan court examined whether a Seattle ordinance that prohibited
women from exposing their breasts in public denied "equality of rights
or impose[d] unequal responsibilities on women., 55 The court reasoned
that the law did not result in sex discrimination because it required both
men and women to conceal certain body parts from public exposure.5 6
Moreover, the court held that the Seattle ordinance did not violate the
ERA because the ordinance's different treatment of men and women was
reasonably related to the actual physical difference between the sexes.57
In other words, because the ordinance's prohibition of exposure of
female breasts was based solely on the anatomical difference between
men and women-the fact that women's breasts are anatomically
different from men's and constitute an erogenous zone that men's
breasts do not-the law did not violate the ERA. 58 To reach this holding,
the court primarily relied on the rationale that the ordinance's
requirement that women cover their breasts in public constituted only an
"inconsequential sacrifice" on the part of women and did not preclude
the women from expressing a fundamental right. 59
The Washington State Supreme Court created a second exception to
the ERA's absolute prohibition of laws that differentiate based on sex
classifications when it held that laws that serve to mandate equality
between women and men do not violate the ERA.60 In Marchioro v.
51. See Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983) (noting absolutist
standard of ERA).
52. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding
that laws based on anatomical differences do not violate ERA); Marchioro v. Chancy, 90 Wash. 2d
298, 306, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (1978) (holding that laws effecting sex classifications do not violate
ERA if they mandate equality between men and women).
53. 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978).
54. Id. at 591, 584 P.2d at 921.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 590-91, 548 P.2d at 921.
60. Marchioro v. Chancy, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 306, 582 P.2d 487,492 (1978).
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Chaney,61 the Washington State Supreme Court upheld a law requiring a
state political party's governing body to elect equal numbers of male and
female members and chairpersons.6 a The court held that while the law at
issue classified according to sex, the classification did not violate the
ERA because it "mandate[d] an equality of responsibility" between
women and men.63 In holding that the statutes at issue did not violate the
ERA, the Marchioro court implied that the law at issue was similar to
the marriage statutes addressed in Singer v. Hara, in that "while there is
certainly a [sex-based] classification, there is equality of treatment [of
the sexes] and this is sufficient to meet the requirements of the equal
rights amendment. ' 64
The Washington State Supreme Court has subsequently construed the
narrow Marchioro exception to mean that the "[ERA's] absolute
mandate of equality does not ... bar affirmative governmental efforts to
create equality in fact.",65 In Southwest Washington Chapter, National
Electrical Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, the court held that a
county ordinance requiring affirmative action in public works
contracting did not violate the ERA because the law was intended to
"ameliorate the effects of past discrimination.'66 Thus, despite the
ordinance's favorable treatment of women over men, its proven intention
to ameliorate past discrimination against women in the construction
industry saved it from violating the ERA.67
In sum, Washington State's ERA absolutely prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex and is not subject to the exceptions permitted under
traditional intermediate or strict scrutiny. In addition, Washington
State's ERA is one of only two laws in the country that hold potentially
sex-discriminatory laws to an absolutist standard.68 Further, the ERA
prevents the legislature from limiting the rights of a class where the
61. 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978).
62. Id. at 308, 582 P.2d at 493.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 307, 582 P.2d at 492 (implying that statutes mandating equal numbers of men and
women on state political party committees are similar to marriage statutes that limit parties in
marriage to male and female because both treat sexes equally) (citing Singer v. Ham, 11 Wash.
App. 247, 253, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1974)).
65. Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 129, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
66. Id. at 128-29, 667 P.2d at 1102.
67. See id. at 129, 667 P.2d at 1103 (excepting statute from ERA based on its purpose to address
underrepresentation of and discrimination against women in construction industry).
68. See Linton, supra note 17, at 911.
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classification is solely based on sex. 6 9 Notwithstanding the absolute
standard of the ERA, Washington State courts permit differentiation by
sex in two narrowly drawn instances: 70 laws that are based on the
anatomical differences between women and men71 and laws that
affirmatively seek to redress past discrimination.72
II. WASHINGTON STATE'S DOMA BANS SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE, BUT STATE TRIAL COURTS HAVE FOUND
THE BAN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As of March 2005, Washington is one of forty-two states that legally
limit marriage to opposite-sex couples; seventeen of these states have
amended their constitutions to this effect.73 Enacted in 1998, Washington
State's DOMA defines marriage as the union of one man and one
woman,7 4 and thereby prohibits a man from marrying a man and a
woman from marrying a woman. In enacting the DOMA, the
Washington State Legislature expressly codified an opinion reached by
Division I of the Washington State Court of Appeals some twenty-four
years earlier.75 Recently, two cases before the state's trial courts have
challenged the constitutionality of the DOMA.76 The Washington State
Supreme Court has granted a request for consolidated and direct review
of these decisions.77
69. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 665, 940 P.2d 642 (1997) (finding that improperly
delineated classes cannot be justified under legislative prerogative).
70. See id. at 664, 940 P.2d at 644 (noting that Washington State Supreme Court has found only
two specific exceptions to ERA).
71. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 491, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978).
72. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 306, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (1978).
73. See Same Sex Marriage License Laws, at
http://marriage.about.com/cs/marriagelicenses/a/samesexcomp.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2005).
74. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010-.020 (2004).
75. See Marriages, ch. 1, § 2, 1998 Wash. Laws I ("It is the intent of the legislature by this act to
codify the Singer opinion .. "); see also Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 260, 522 P.2d 1187,
1195 (1974) (holding that sex classification effected by marriage statutes' definition of marriage
was based on unique physical characteristics of sexes and did not discriminate on basis of sex).
76. See Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at *2 (Super. Ct. Thurston County
Sept. 7, 2004) (memorandum opinion on constitutionality); Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-
04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *3-4 (Super. Ct. King County Aug. 4, 2004) (memorandum
opinion and order on cross motions for summary judgment).
77. See Letter from Ronald Carpenter, Deputy Clerk, Washington State Supreme Court, to Clerk
and Counsel in Castle v. State and Andersen v. King County 2 (Sept. 29, 2004) (notifying parties of
consolidation and accelerated direct review).
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A. Washington State's DOMA Limits Marriage to Opposite-Sex
Couples
In 1998, the Washington State Legislature enacted Washington
State's DOMA. By enacting the DOMA, the legislature revised
Washington State's marriage statutes to define marriage expressly as a
"civil contract between a male and a female. 79 In addition, through
references to "husband" and "wife," the DOMA implicitly suggests that
valid marriages exist only between members of the opposite sex.
80
Finally, the last section of the DOMA expressly disallows same-sex
marriage by prohibiting marriages "[w]hen the parties are persons other
than a male and a female." 81
B. Prior to the DOMA, Division I of the Washington State Court of
Appeals Held that Marriage Exists Only Between a Man and a
Woman
As enacted by the state legislature, Washington State's DOMA
represents an explicit codification of the decision reached by Division I
of the Washington State Court of Appeals in Singer v. Hara.82 In Singer,
the court noted that Washington State's pre-DOMA statutory definition
of marriage, through reference to the different sexes, provided for a valid
marriage only between a man and a woman. 83 The Singer court held that
this limitation of marriage did not violate the ERA's constitutional
prohibition against differential treatment of the sexes.84
In Singer, two men, John Singer and Paul Barwick, brought suit
against King County Auditor Lloyd Hara, claiming that the
government's denial of their application for a marriage license violated
78. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010-.020 (2004).
79. Id. § 26.04.010(1).
80. See, e.g., id. § 26.040.010(2) ("Every marriage entered into in which either the husband or the
wife....").
81. Id. § 26.04.020(1)(c).
82. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 260, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1974); see also Marriages, ch.
1, § 2, 1998 Wash. Laws 1 ("It is the intent of the legislature by this act to codify the Singer
opinion....").
83. Singer, 11 Wash. App at 253, 522 P.2d at 1191.
84. Id. at. 249, 522 P.2d at 1189. While the Singer court's decision predates the DOMA by
approximately twenty-four years, its decision became central to the codification of DOMA. See
Marriages, ch. 1, § 2, 1998 Wash. Laws 1.
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their constitutional rights.85 Specifically, Singer and Barwick claimed
that the state marriage statutes, which allowed a man to marry a woman,
but prohibited a man from marrying a man, constituted a sex-based
classification forbidden by the ERA.86 The Singer court construed the
ERA narrowly to hold that the statutory definition of marriage did not
discriminate on the basis of sex.87 The court reasoned that the same-sex
couple was not prohibited from marrying because of their sex; rather, the
two men, like two similarly situated women, had equal access to marry a
member of the opposite sex.88 As such, the men were prohibited from
marrying not by virtue of their sex but solely because marriage was
limited, by implicit statutory definition, to unions between members of
89the opposite sex.
In upholding a statutory definition of marriage that limited marriage
to opposite-sex couples, the Singer court refuted Singer and Barwick's
argument that the sexual classifications imposed by the Washington
State marriage statutes were analogous to racial classifications inherent
in anti-miscegenation statutes overturned by the United States Supreme
Court.90 In Loving v. Virginia,91 the United States Supreme Court held
that laws forbidding interracial marriage unconstitutionally classified
according to race, regardless of the state's contention that the laws
applied equally to all races. 92 Virginia argued that its statutory
prohibition of interracial marriage applied equally to Caucasians and
African Americans because it equally forbade both races from marrying
members of another race. 93 However, the Court rejected this argument
and held that anti-miscegenation statutes violated the U.S.
Constitution.94 In interpreting Loving, the Singer court reasoned that the
definition of marriage at issue in Washington-the legal union of one
85. Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 248, 522 P.2d at 1188.
86. Id. at 250-52, 522 P.2d at 1190-91.
87. See id. at 254-55, 522 P.2d at 1192.
88. Id. at 255, 522 P.2d at 1192.
89. See id. at 253, 522 P.2d at 1191 (defining marriage as legal union of one man and one
woman).
90. See id.
91. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
92. Id. at 11 (holding that Virginia's miscegenation statutes, which limited marriage to members
of same race, rested solely on distinctions of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
Fourteenth Amendment).
93. See id. at 8 (noting party's contention that, by punishing both parties in unlawful marriage,
anti-miscegenation statutes applied equally to both races).
94. Id. at 11.
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man and one woman-was impliedly operative and upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Loving.95 Further, the Singer court reasoned that, far
from relying on an unconstitutional classification such as race,
Washington State's marriage laws precluded same-sex marriage solely
by virtue of marriage's definition.96 The court stated, "[Singer and
Barwick] are not being denied entry into the marriage relationship
because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry into the marriage
relationship because of the recognized definition of that
",97
relationship ....
C. In Andersen and Castle, Washington State Trial Courts Declined to
Address Whether the DOMA Violates the ERA
The constitutionality of Washington State's DOMA, which codifies
the Singer holding, has only recently come before the state's trial
courts.98 In Andersen v. King County, eight same-sex couples wishing to
marry brought suit against the county. They claimed the DOMA violated
various clauses of the state constitution, including the ERA.99 Similarly,
in Castle v. State, the plaintiffs alleged that the DOMA's preclusion of
marriage between adult couples of the same sex violated the state
constitution.100 The Andersen and Castle courts found that the DOMA
violated the state constitution, 10 1 but decided the cases on different
grounds and relied on different interpretations of state and federal law.
102
However, both courts declined to decide whether the DOMA violated
the ERA's prohibition against unequal application of the laws on
account of sex.103
95. See Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 253, 522 P.2d at 1192 (noting that Loving court did not change
basic definition of marriage as legal union of one man and one woman).
96. Id. at 254-55, 522 P.2d at 1192.
97. Id.
98. See generally Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215 (Super. Ct. Thurston
County Sept. 7, 2004) (memorandum opinion on constitutionality); Andersen v. King County, No.
04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447 (Super. Ct. King County Aug. 4, 2004) (memorandum
opinion and order on cross motions for summary judgment).
99. See Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *2-4.
100. Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *2.
101. Id., at *16; Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *11.
102. See Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *16 (holding DOMA violated privileges and immunities
clause of state constitution); Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *I 1 (holding DOMA violated both
privileges and immunities and due process provisions of state constitution).
103. See Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *3 (noting that only higher court can examine DOMA
under ERA and applicability of Singer); Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at * 11 (deferring to
547
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In Andersen, the court based its constitutional assessment of the
DOMA largely on whether the law's prohibition of same-sex marriage
violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Washington State
Constitution.' 0 4  After determining that the right to marry is a
fundamental right, the court employed what it termed heightened
scrutiny, utilizing standards from federal equal protection analyses to
examine the DOMA. 105 Pursuant to this analysis, the court found that the
DOMA's limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples was not
substantiated by, nor rationally related to, a compelling state interest,
and neither was it narrowly tailored to any such interest. 10 6 As such, the
court held the DOMA violates the Washington State Constitution
because the fundamental right to marry is "not being made equally
available to all citizens."' 7 However, the Andersen court did not
consider whether the DOMA's prohibition of same-sex marriage
constitutes discrimination on account of sex, in violation of the ERA. 08
The trial court explained its refusal to examine the DOMA's potential
violation of the ERA by deferring to the controlling precedent of
Singer.'0 9 It noted that only a higher court, such as the Washington State
Supreme Court, could overrule a decision of the Washington State Court
of Appeals." 0
Like the court in Andersen, the Castle court noted that it was, by
virtue of its "obligation to respect and follow the Singer decision,"
Washington State Supreme Court on constitutionality of DOMA under ERA).
104. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, [or] class of
citizens... privileges or immunities which on the same terms shall not equally belong to all
citizens."); see Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *3-7.
105. See Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *7 ("The court concludes that [the DOMA] must be
scrutinized as statutes negatively impacting the plaintiffs' fundamental right to marry."); see also
Castle, 2004 WL 1985215, at *11 (noting Andersen court employed federal equal protection
analysis rather than state constitutional privileges and immunities analysis).
106. See Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *9-11 (barring same-sex couples from marrying does
not serve interest of encouraging procreation nor is such ban rationally related to goal of nurturing
and providing for emotional well-being of children).
107. Id. at *11. The court also held that the DOMA violates the substantive due process clause of
the state constitution, yet relied on its analysis of the privileges and immunities clause violation to
support this conclusion. See id. (concluding denial of right to marry constitutes denial of substantive
due process).
108. Id.
109. See id. (noting court was bound by Singer court's decision); see also supra Part II.B
(summarizing Singer court's pre-DOMA ruling that statutory ban on same-sex marriage did not
violate ERA).
110. Andersen, 2004 WL 1738447, at *11 ("Although the Washington State Supreme Court may
freely do so, this [c]ourt does not find itself in a position to overrule the Singer decision.").
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precluded from examining whether the DOMA's prohibition of same-
sex marriage constituted a violation of the ERA.'1 ' Rather, the court
restricted its analysis of the DOMA to determine only whether the
statute violated the state constitution's privileges and immunities
clause."l 2 However, in analyzing the level of protection afforded by that
clause, the court invoked the ERA. 1 3 Specifically, the Castle judge
concluded that, because the protections afforded by Washington State's
ERA go beyond similar protections afforded by the Equal Protection
Clause of the federal Constitution, the individual protections afforded by
Washington State's Privileges and Immunities Clause call for a stricter
analysis than would be applied under federal equal protection
analysis.' 14
The Castle court held, as did the Andersen court, that marriage is a
fundamental right but went on to find that homosexuals are a suspect
class-a socially-recognized class of citizens subject to adverse social
and political stereotyping. 15 Referring to the additional protections the
Washington State Constitution affords to its citizens, the court relied on
marriage's existence as a fundamental right and homosexuals' status as a
suspect class to apply strict scrutiny to the DOMA. 116 The court
concluded that the statute did not further the state's purported interest in
procreation and stable environments for children, nor was the DOMA
narrowly tailored to that interest."
17
In sum, the question of whether the DOMA violates the ERA presents
an issue of first impression for the Washington State Supreme Court.
Although Division I examined the issue of same-sex marriage in relation
to the ERA in 1974,118 courts have yet to address specifically whether
the DOMA violates the ERA. Washington State trial courts that have
addressed the constitutionality of the DOMA have deferred to Singer as
binding precedent to justify their refusal to address claims that the
111. Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at *3 (Super. Ct. Thurston Cty. Sept.
7, 2004) (memorandum opinion on constitutionality).
112. Id. at *16 (noting that decision based on privileges and immunities grounds obviated need to
examine other constitutional claims).
113. Id. at *8.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *11, *13.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *16.
118. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 249, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974).
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DOMA violates the ERA.' 19 Thus, the question of whether the DOMA
denies or abridges equal rights under the law on account of sex can be
determined by only the Washington State Supreme Court.
III. OTHER JURISDICTIONS APPLY A LESS STRINGENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO SEX CLASSIFICATIONS
As interpreted by the Washington State Supreme Court, Washington
State's ERA mandates that courts examine laws that classify according
to sex with absolute scrutiny. 120 It follows that any law premised upon a
sex-based classification is presumed unconstitutional unless it meets one
of two narrowly drawn exceptions. 121 Such scrutiny exceeds the
intermediate scrutiny used by federal courts examining sex
classifications under an equal protection analysis. 22 Similarly, state
courts examining the constitutionality of state laws banning same-sex
marriage have employed standards of review less stringent than the
standard imposed by Washington State's ERA. 123 However, under these
lesser standards of review, federal and state courts have found that sex
classifications may result in unlawful sex discrimination.1 24 Finally,
where state courts have determined that laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples effect sex classifications, they have ruled that such
classifications constitute unconstitutional sex discrimination. 125
119. See id. at *3; Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at *11
(Super. Ct. King County Aug. 4, 2004) (memorandum opinion and order on cross motions for
summary judgment).
120. See Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
121. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 491, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding
that laws based on actual sex differences do not violate ERA); Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d
298, 306, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (1978) (holding that laws effecting sex classifications do not violate
ERA if they mandate equality between men and women).
122. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996) (noting that sex classifications
are subject to standard of heightened review).
123. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 972 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring); see also Linton, supra note 17, at 911
(noting that Washington is one of two states to apply absolutist standard to sex-based
classifications).
124. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534; Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64-66; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 971-72
(Greaney, J., concurring).
125. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67-68; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring).
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A. Federal Courts Apply Intermediate Scrutiny to Classifications
Based on Sex
Using what is known as intermediate scrutiny, federal courts have
determined that classifications based on sex are discriminatory unless
the government can demonstrate that its justification for the
classification is genuine, the classification does not rely on overbroad
generalizations of the sexes, and the discriminatory means used are
substantially related to the state's objectives. 126 In United States v.
Virginia,121 7 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Virginia's exclusion of
women from the all-male Virginia Military Institute (VMI) resulted in
sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
federal Constitution. 128 The Court engaged in a detailed examination of
the state's justifications for the exclusion of women, which included the
importance of single sex education and the uniqueness of VMI's method
of character development and leadership training.129 The Court
determined that those justifications were facially tenable, but not
exceedingly persuasive under the heightened review required by
intermediate scrutiny' 30 -a level of review it termed "skeptical scrutiny"
or "heightened review."' 31 As a result, the Court ultimately ruled that the
state's justifications did not proffer the "solid base" necessary to
maintain a sex classification that categorically excluded women.
32
B. Other State Courts Find Sex Discrimination in State Laws Limiting
Marriage to Same-Sex Couples
Judges interpreting equal protection clauses of state constitutions have
concluded that laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples establish
sex-based classifications. 33 In Baehr v. Lewin,' 34 the Supreme Court of
126. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150
(1980)).
127. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
128. Id. at 534.
129. See id. at 535-41.
130. Id. at 534 ("Measuring the record in this case against the review standard... we conclude
that Virginia has shown no 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for excluding all women [from
VMI] .... ).
131. Id. at 531-33.
132. Id. at 546.
133. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 971-72 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring).
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Hawaii considered whether the Hawaii marriage statutes implicitly
violated the equal protection clause of the Hawaii State Constitution 3 5
by requiring two people applying for a marriage license to be of the
opposite sex. 136 Construing Hawaii's marriage statutes according to their
plain language, the court concluded that the state regulated "access to
[marriage] on the basis of the applicants' sex. 137 Obliged by its state
constitution to examine such sex-based classifications with strict
scrutiny, the Baehr court held that the marriage statutes denied same-sex
couples access to marriage and were thus presumptively
unconstitutional. 1
38
In addition, the Baehr court noted that it would be illogical to rely on
the statutory definition of marriage as a union between a man and a
woman when ruling on a case challenging that very definition. 39 In so
doing, the court distinguished the logic employed by the Singer court in
Washington as "tortured and conclusory sophistry.' 40 The Baehr court
held that the sex-based classifications used by Hawaii's marriage statute
were presumptively unconstitutional because they denied same-sex
couples the right to marry solely on the basis of sex.' 4'
Other state courts that have struck down laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage have based their holdings on grounds other than unlawful sex
134. 852 P.2d44 (Haw. 1993).
135. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex
or ancestry."); see Baehr, 852 P.2d at 54 (concluding that factual question existed regarding
marriage statutes' violation of equal protection clause of Hawaii's constitution). The analysis under
the equal protection clause of the Hawaii constitution was one of two grounds on which the Baehr
court ruled. Id. at 50. The court also considered whether the marriage statutes violated the right to
privacy guaranteed by the Hawaii State Constitution. See id. at 55-64.
136. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-50 (observing that through numerous direct and indirect references to
gender, Hawaii marriage statutes imply that applicant couples must be composed of members of
opposite sex).
137. Id. at 60 (concluding that numerous references to brother and sister, wife and husband, and
man and woman limited marriage to members of opposite sex).
138. Id. at 67. On remand, the trial court invalidated the state law. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No.
91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). However, Hawaii voters
ultimately amended their state's constitution to allow the legislature to limit marriage to same-sex
couples. See HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23 ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples.").
139. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 61 (noting that argument that same-sex couples do not have right to
marry because definition of marriage precludes such right is "circular and unpersuasive").
140. Id. at 63.
141. Id. at 67.
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discrimination. 142 Yet the issue of whether laws banning same-sex
marriage are based on sex classifications in violation of state
constitutions continues to inform these decisions. 143 In a concurring
opinion to Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,14 4 Justice John M.
Greaney of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that
the ban on same-sex marriage effected by the state's marriage statutes
violated the state constitution. 45 Specifically, he noted that the limited
statutory definition of those eligible for marriage resulted in an
unconstitutional classification based on sex. 146 Noting that the statutes
constrained an individual's choice of marital partner on the basis of his
or her sex, the concurrence employed strict scrutiny to conclude that the
state presented no compelling interest to justify this sex-based
classification.
47
Massachusetts contended that its marriage law was constitutional
because it applied uniformly to both sexes. 148 Justice Greaney noted,
however, that uniform application did not preclude the court from
finding a sex-based classification because the sex classification operated
on an individual level-preventing an individual from marrying his or
her chosen partner solely because of the chosen partner's sex. 149 Similar
142. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding
Massachusetts marriage licensing statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples denied same-
sex couples freedom to partake in benefits guaranteed by state constitution); Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864, 889 (Vt. 1999) (holding Vermont marriage statutes categorically excluded same-sex
couples from rights and benefits guaranteed by state constitution's common benefits clause).
143. See Goodridge, 798 N.E. 2d at 971-72 (Greaney, J., concurring) (stating that marriage
statutes create unjustified statutory sex classification); Baker, 744 A.2d at 906 (Johnson, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (concluding that, under Vermont law, individual's right to marry person
of same sex is constrained solely on basis of sex).
144. 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
145. Id. at 970 (Greaney, J., concurring) (concluding that, under traditional equal protection
analysis, marriage statutes violated Massachusetts constitution).
146. See id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring) ("The marriage statutes prohibit some
applicants.., from obtaining a marriage license... based solely on the applicants' gender.").
Justice Greaney also concluded that the state's marriage statutes denied same-sex couples the
fundamental right to marry. See id. at 970 ("The right to marry is... a fundamental right that is
protected against unwarranted State interference.").
147. See id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring) (defining standard of review as strict scrutiny).
148. See id. at 971 (Greaney, J., concurring).
149. See id. Specifically, Justice Greaney stated that:
A classification may be gender based whether or not the challenged government action
apportions benefits or burdens uniformly along gender lines .... [It is] disingenuous, at best,
to suggest that such an individual's right to marry has not been burdened at all, because he or
she remains free to chose [sic] another partner, who is of the opposite sex.
Id.
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to the court in Baehr, the Goodridge concurrence noted that relying upon
the definition of marriage as the legal union of a man and a woman to
justify the exclusion of same-sex couples from having access to marriage
is "conclusory and bypasses the core question [the court was] asked to
decide. '
150
In conclusion, under the intermediate scrutiny employed by federal
courts, laws effecting a sex-based classification may pass constitutional
muster if the state can demonstrate that the classification serves
important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means are
substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. Likewise,
even under the higher standard of strict scrutiny employed by certain
state courts when examining sex-based classifications, such
classifications may be constitutional. However, in the area of same-sex
marriage, state courts have found that sex-based classifications effected
by laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples do not survive strict
scrutiny and, thus, are unconstitutional.
IV. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT SHOULD
HOLD THAT THE DOMA VIOLATES THE ERA
Washington State's DOMA effects a sex-based classification that
permits or denies access to marriage solely on account of sex. As it has
been interpreted by Washington State courts since Singer v. Hara, the
ERA mandates that courts examine sex-based classifications with
absolute scrutiny, 151 a level of review that exceeds the standards
employed by other jurisdictions examining the constitutionality of sex-
based classifications. 152 Under absolute scrutiny, the Washington State
Supreme Court should apply its post-Singer ERA precedent to hold that
the DOMA's sex classification denies or restricts equality on the basis of
sex. Further, the DOMA satisfies neither of the two narrowly drawn
exceptions to the ERA established by courts since Division I's ruling in
Singer.'53 Accordingly, the Washington State Supreme Court should rule
that the DOMA's prohibition of same-sex marriage effects an
150. Id. at 972-73 (Greaney, J., concurring).
151. See supra Part I.A.
152. See supra Part III.
153. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 591, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding
that laws based on anatomical differences between men and women do not violate ERA); Marchioro
v. Chancy, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 306, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (1978) (holding that laws effecting sex
classifications do not violate ERA if they mandate equality between men and women).
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unconstitutional sex classification in violation of the ERA.
A. Washington State's DOMA Effects a Sex-Based Classification
In examining the DOMA under the ERA, the Washington State
Supreme Court should look first to the text of the statute in light of the
ERA. The DOMA defines marriage as "a civil contract between a male
and a female."'154 Further, it specifically prohibits marriage "[w]hen the
parties are persons other than a male and a female."' 155 Washington
State's DOMA effects a sex classification because its statutory definition
of marriage explicitly refers to sex to define marriage as well as who
legally has a right to it.
156
The fact that sex is critical to the application of the DOMA further
substantiates the conclusion that the DOMA effects a sex-based
classification. Marriage license applications are designed to allow only
opposite-sex couples to apply to have their marriages legally recognized
in Washington State. 157 Because of the DOMA, the sex of each applicant
is essential to the county auditor's determination of whether to issue or
deny the marriage license. 1
58
B. The DOMA's Sex Classification Violates the ERA's Absolute
Prohibition of Sex Discrimination
As the Washington State Supreme Court held in Darrin v. Gould,
laws that bar or limit equal access solely on the basis of sex
classifications constitute sex discrimination prohibited by the ERA,
regardless of any justification or interest asserted by the state. 5 9 Under
the absolute scrutiny required by the ERA, a court must examine the
DOMA's sex-based classification with a level of scrutiny beyond that
154. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010(1) (2004).
155. Id. § 26.04.020(1)(c).
156. See id. § 26.04.010.
157. See, e.g., King County Marriage License Application (requiring declaration of sex of each
applicant for marriage license), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/lars/marriage/mlapp.pdf (last
visited Feb. 11, 2005); Thurston Country Marriage License Application (requiring declaration of
sex of each applicant for marriage license), available at
http://www.co.thurston.wa.us/auditor/Recording/Forms/Marriage%20Application.pdf (last visited
Feb. 11, 2005).
158. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.140 ("Before any persons can be joined in marriage, they
shall procure a license from a county auditor .... ").
159. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 876-77, 540 P.2d 882, 892-93 (1975).
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employed by courts in other jurisdictions. 160 While the DOMA's sex-
based classification might survive intermediate scrutiny under federal
law, 161 it does not satisfy the ERA's mandatory absolute scrutiny.
Similarly, even if Washington State's DOMA might survive judicial
scrutiny in other state jurisdictions, its sex classification should, by
virtue of the ERA's absolutist standard, be held to a stricter standard by
the Washington State Supreme Court.1
62
The DOMA denies equal rights on account of sex. Akin to the
situation in Darrin, where girls were denied equal access to play football
solely because of their sex, 1 63 same-sex couples in Washington are,
under the DOMA, denied equal access to marriage solely because of the
sex of one of the partners in the couple. Courts since Singer have
interpreted the ERA to absolutely prohibit discrimination based on
sex, 164 which mandates a level of scrutiny beyond that required in other
jurisdictions. 165 Therefore, the Washington State Supreme Court should
apply absolute scrutiny to hold that the DOMA's limitation on access to
marriage--one based solely on sex-violates the ERA.
In Darrin, the court noted that but for their sex girls were otherwise
eligible to play football. 166 Similarly, under the DOMA, but for the sex
of one partner in a couple, same-sex couples who are otherwise eligible
to marry are prohibited from doing SO. 167 For example, suppose that two
individuals-A, a male, and B, a female-would both like to marry C, a
female. Under Washington State's DOMA, A will be allowed to marry
C, but B will be prohibited from marrying C. The differential treatment
160. See Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 127, 667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983) (noting that ERA
absolutely prohibits inequality based on sex); see also Linton, supra note 17, at 911 (1997) (noting
that Washington is one of two states to apply absolutist standard to sex-based classifications); supra
Parts IA, III.
161. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996) (noting that sex classifications
are subject to intermediate scrutiny); see also supra Part III.A (summarizing standard of review
employed by federal courts examining claims of sex discrimination).
162. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 663--64, 940 P.2d 642, 643-44 (1997) (noting that
rational relationship and strict scrutiny tests for sex classifications are not relevant under ERA).
163. See Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 876, 540 P.2d at 892 (determining that solely because of sex,
girls were not provided access to interscholastic sports equal to that provided to boys).
164. See In re Welfare of Hauser, 15 Wash. App. 231, 237, 548 P.2d 333, 337 (1976); supra Part
Ill.
165. See Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d at 127, 667 P.2d at 1102 (noting that ERA absolutely prohibits
inequality based on sex).
166. Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 861, 540 P.2d at 884.
167. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.020(I)(c) (2004) (prohibiting marriages when parties are
persons other than one male and one female).
556
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of A and B under the DOMA is based on their sex. Under the absolute
scrutiny required by the ERA, such differential treatment is
unconstitutional sex discrimination. 168 The Washington State Supreme
Court should rule that the DOMA effects unconstitutional sex
discrimination.
The Washington State Supreme Court's decision in Guard provides
further guidance as to the kinds of laws courts will invalidate under the
ERA. Notwithstanding the state legislature's ability to place conditions
on the legal right of marriage, 169 the sex classification effected by the
DOMA violates the state constitution. Similar to the law at issue in
Guard, which limited the right to bring a claim of wrongful death on
account of the sex of the plaintiff,170 the DOMA expressly denies the
right to marry on account of the sex of the persons seeking to be
married.171 Under the DOMA, an opposite-sex couple is granted access
to marriage, while a same-sex couple is denied that right solely because
of the sex of one of the applicants. 172 As the court held in Guard, under
the ERA a sex classification that denies equal access to the law results in
sex discrimination. 1
73
C. The DOMA Does Not Satisfy Either of the Exceptions to the ERA
To be constitutional, the sex classification effected by the DOMA
would have to meet one of two exceptions to the ERA created by the
Washington State Supreme Court since Division I's decision in
Singer.174 These exceptions are narrowly drawn, and have been applied
only rarely since the ERA was passed. 175 Because the DOMA does not
meet either of the two exceptions, it violates the Washington State
Constitution.
168. See Darrin, 85 Wash. 2d at 877, 540 P.2d at 893.
169. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 665, 940 P.2d 642,644 (1997).
170. Id. at 666, 940 P.2d at 645.
171. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010-.020 (defining marriage as union of man and woman and
prohibiting marriage when parties are persons other than one male and one female).
172. Id.
173. See Guard, 132 Wash. 2d at 667, 940 P.2d at 645.
174. See City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 491, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding
that laws based on actual sex differences do not violate ERA); Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d
298, 306, 582 P.2d 487, 492 (1978) (holding that laws effecting sex classifications do not violate
ERA if they mandate equality between men and women).
175. See Guard, 132 Wash. 2d at 664, 666, 940 P.2d at 644-45.
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1. The DOMA Is Not Based on Physical Differences Between the
Sexes
The DOMA is not based on actual anatomical differences between
men and women. As such, its sex-based classification does not meet the
anatomical difference exception to the ERA created and applied by the
Buchanan court. 176 Further, unlike the statute in Buchanan, which
neither involved nor impinged on any serious interest, 77 the DOMA's
limitation of marriage directly affects a serious interest-the right to
marry the partner of one's choice. 
178
The dissimilarity between the ordinance at issue in Buchanan and the
DOMA is clarified by the Buchanan court's explanation of the exception
it created to the ERA. In Buchanan, the court held that there is no
violation of the ERA when a law's differential treatment of the sexes is
reasonably related to an actual physical difference between them. 179
There, the differential treatment of the sexes created by the city
ordinance-which required women, but not men, to cover their breasts
in public-was reasonably related to the anatomical difference between
men's and women's breasts.180 However, the differential treatment
effected by the DOMA's sex classification, which prevents same-sex
couples from marrying, is not reasonably related to the anatomical
physical differences between the sexes-notably the inability of same-
sex couples to procreate.
The inapplicability of the Buchanan exception to the DOMA is
evinced most notably by other jurisdictions' treatment of laws banning
same-sex marriage. For example, when examining laws limiting
marriage to opposite-sex couples, courts with standards less strict than
the absolutist standard imposed by Washington State's ERA have noted
that physical differences related to sex are no longer valid when viewed
in the context of marriage. 18 Because opposite-sex couples no longer
marry solely to procreate and same-sex couples are capable of
176. See Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 591, 584 P.2d at 921.
177. Id. at 590, 584 P.2d at 921 (holding that denying women privilege to expose breasts in
public did not involve serious interest).
178. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (noting that marriage is right "fundamental to
our very existence").
179. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 591, 548 P.2d at 921.
180. Id.
181. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962 (Mass. 2003); Baker v.
Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 881 (Vt. 1999).
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conceiving and raising children, the anatomical differences between the
sexes are no longer valid reasons to preclude same-sex couples from
marrying.182 Further, Washington courts have held that reproductive
differences between men and women that are not directly or
substantially related to a law's purpose do not justify differential
treatment and thus do not meet the Buchanan exception to the ERA. 83
Finally, the anatomical difference exception to the ERA applies where
a law based on a sex classification does not curtail a "serious interest.'
184
In Buchanan, the Washington State Supreme Court reasoned that the
privilege of women to expose their breasts in public was neither serious
nor intrinsic to the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.' 85 As
such, the Buchanan court held that, despite the sex classification effected
by the Seattle city ordinance, the public's interest in regulating public
peace and decorum outweighed the inconsequential interest of women to
go topless in public.' 86 Contrary to the law at issue in Buchanan, the
DOMA's sex classification and its resulting prohibition of same-sex
marriage affect an interest of great consequence to the citizens of
Washington-the right to marry. The serious nature of the interest
affected by the DOMA is illustrated by the language the U.S. Supreme
Court employed in Loving, in which the Court referred to marriage as a
right "fundamental to our very existence."' 187 Given that the Washington
State Supreme Court has applied this anatomical difference exception to
the ERA only once in the three decades since the passage of the ERA,188
the court should not now apply the exception to a situation where the
interest affected is one of the "basic civil rights of man."'
189
182. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962.
183. See, e.g., Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 667, 940 P.2d 642, 645 (1997) ("The
capacity to suffer loss when a child dies is not unique to mothers."); see also Buchanan, 90 Wash.
2d at 592, 584 P.2d at 92 (finding that differential treatment between sexes was directly and
substantially related to legislative purpose behind city ordinance).
184. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 590, 584 P.2d at 921.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 590-91, 584 P.2d at 921.
187. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
188. See Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 591, 584 P.2d at 921 (creating exception to ERA by holding
that laws based on actual anatomical differences do not violate ERA).
189. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
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2. The DOMA Does Not Ameliorate the Effects of Past
Discrimination
The sex classification effected by the DOMA does not meet the
second exception to the ERA announced by the Washington State
Supreme Court in Marchioro.'90 The Marchioro court upheld a statute
under the ERA because it mandated an equality of responsibility
between the sexes.' 91 Through its sex-based classification, however, the
DOMA results in inequality based on sex. 192 While the Marchioro court
cited Singer to conclude that laws limiting marriage to opposite sex
couples mandate equality between the sexes, 193 this reference is
misplaced and legally inapposite.' 94
As it was clarified by the Washington State Supreme Court in
Southwest, 195 the Marchioro exception to the ERA does not apply to the
DOMA. Contrary to the affirmative action plan at issue in Southwest,
which sought to ameliorate past discrimination against women in public
works contracting, 196 the DOMA does not create equality in fact. Rather,
the DOMA's reliance on and codification of sex-based classifications
creates a situation where a person is legally prohibited from marrying
the partner of his or her choice because that person is of the same sex. 97
Such sex-based exclusion from the rights and responsibilities of the law
is expressly precluded by the plain language of the ERA. 198
D. Singer Is Inapposite Because the DOMA Does Not Apply Equally
to the Sexes
In upholding the marriage statutes prior to the DOMA, the Singer
court concluded that Washington State's marriage laws banning same-
sex marriage did not violate the ERA because they applied equally to
190. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 308, 582 P.2d 487, 493 (1978).
191. See id.
192. See supra Part 1V.B.
193. See Marchioro, 90 Wash. 2d at 307, 582 P.2d at 492 (citing Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App.
247, 253, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1974)).
194. See infra Part 1V.D.
195. Southwest, 100 Wash. 2d. 109, 127-28,667 P.2d 1092, 1102 (1983).
196. Id. at 111,667 P.2d at 1093-94.
197. See supra Part IV.A.
198. WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1 ("Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not
be denied or abridged on account of sex.").
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both sexes. 199 Specifically, the court reasoned that, because the marriage
statutes prohibited both sexes equally from marrying a member of the
same sex, they did not violate the ERA.200 Despite Division I's holding
in Singer, the Washington State Supreme Court has, in adopting an
absolutist stance against sex discrimination, recognized no equal
application exception to the ERA. 201 That is, a court will hold any law
effecting a sex classification unconstitutional unless that law meets one
of only two narrowly drawn exceptions, regardless of whether the law
purports to apply equally to both sexes.20 2 To date, the Washington State
Supreme Court has recognized no other exceptions to the ERA.
In addition, Singer is inapposite because Division I erroneously
dismissed the precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court in Loving.
20 3
Refuting the argument that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes
applied equally to both races, the Loving court noted that any equal
application was negated by the fact that the racial classifications made
by the law constituted "an arbitrary and invidious discrimination.,
20 4
The Singer court dismissed the analogy to Loving by asserting the
definition of the very matter at issue: marriage. 20 5 As a result, the Singer
court failed to apply the level of scrutiny required by the ERA. In other
words, in ruling that Washington State law did not unconstitutionally
preclude a same-sex couple from exercising the right of marriage, the
court utilized a definition of marriage as the "legal union of one man and
one woman."206 Under Division I's rationale, no discrimination existed,
nor could it ever exist because John Singer and Paul Barwick were not
precluded from marrying each other by virtue of their sex; rather their
relationship was wholly foreign, by definition, to the institution of
199. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 249, 522 P.2d 1187, 1189 (1974).
200. Id. at 255 n.8, 522 P.2d at 1192 n.8 (noting that marriage statutes applied equally to both
sexes and thus did not violate ERA).
201. See supra Part I.C (outlining only two existing exceptions to ERA).
202. See Guard v. Jackson, 132 Wash. 2d 660, 664, 940 P.2d 642, 644 (1997); see also City of
Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 491, 584 P.2d 918, 921 (1978) (holding that laws based on
anatomical differences do not violate ERA); Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 306, 582 P.2d
487, 492 (1978) (holding that laws effecting sex classifications do not violate ERA if they mandate
equality between men and women).
203. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that racial classifications effected by
Virginia's anti-miscegenation statutes violated equal protection clause).
204. Id. at 10.
205. Singer, 11 Wash. App. at 254-55, 522 P.2d at 1191-92.
206. Id. at 254, 522 P.2d at 1196.
Washington Law Review
marriage itself.207
As the Baehr and Goodridge courts noted when they found their
states' laws prohibiting same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional, the
logic employed by the Singer court is conclusory at best and deceptive at
worst. 208 Further, such logic does not withstand the absolute bar to sex-
based classifications effected by the ERA as the Washington State
Supreme Court has interpreted it since Singer.20 9 Because Singer does
not control the Washington State Supreme Court as it did the Andersen
and Castle courts,210 the Washington State Supreme Court should follow
its precedent under the ERA to find that the sex-based classifications
inherent to the DOMA are unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington State Supreme Court should hold that the DOMA
violates the Washington State Constitution because the DOMA effects a
sex classification that is precluded by Washington State's ERA.
Ultimately, the court may choose to rule on grounds other than the ERA,
but given the criticism other state courts have leveled against the logic
employed by Division I in Singer, the Washington State Supreme Court
would be remiss to allow Singer's logic to stand. Furthermore, as
Washington's DOMA represents a codification of the Singer opinion, it
is subject to similar criticism. In light of the current political and social
zeitgeist, a Washington State Supreme Court ruling holding that the
207. See id. at 254-55,522 P.2dat 1191-92.
208. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting logic in Singer as "tortured and
conclusory sophistry"); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972-73 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring) ("To define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to
whom it always has been accessible, in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has
been accessible, is conclusory and bypasses the core question we are asked to decide."). It should be
noted that while the majority opinion in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999),
dismisses a sex discrimination argument and any analogy to Loving, the court in Vermont was not
construing the state's marriage statutes with the kind of absolutist standard required by
Washington's ERA.
209. See supra Part I.A-.B (summarizing Washington State Supreme Court's construction of
ERA as absolute bar to sex classifications, which courts subject to absolutist standard of review).
210. See Castle v. State, No. 04-2-00614-4, 2004 WL 1985215, at *3 (Super. Ct. Thurston Cty.
Sept. 7, 2004) (memorandum opinion on constitutionality) (noting that only Court of Appeals or
Washington State Supreme Court can review Singer); Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-
SEA, 2004 WL 1738447, at * 11 (Super. Ct. King County Aug. 4, 2004) (memorandum opinion and
order on cross motions for summary judgment) (deferring to Washington State Supreme Court on
constitutionality of DOMA under ERA).
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DOMA is unconstitutional could engender a movement to amend the
state's constitution to ensure what the DOMA could not-that marriages
between same-sex couples are constitutionally prohibited. Such a
movement would require, in addition to a vote of the legislature, a vote
of the people. As a result, just as they did in 1972 with the ERA, the
people of Washington would have to vote to alter the rights and
protections afforded by the Washington State Constitution. Ironically,
while a vote for the ERA expanded such rights and protections, a vote in
the present case would have the opposite effect.
564
